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Counterintuitive Thoughts on Legal
Scholarship and Secured Transactions
HEATHER HUGHESt
INTRODUCTION
I teach and write in the field of commercial law. Let's
say I have a potentially beneficial, though credit-limiting
and therefore radical, idea for a change in the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC).1 I decide to devote research
energies to this idea. I want to figure out whether my
unorthodox concept, if implemented, would facilitate
corporate responsibility or just result in a dearth of
available financing. 2
I start to think about this research but I have already,
in a sense, read too much. I am haunted by James J.
White's statement that "[b]anks and other secured creditors
t Assistant Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. I
thank the editors of the Buffalo Law Review for inviting me to "think in public"
in their annual Essay Issue. I give special thanks to Susan Carle, Pierre Schlag,
Daniel Farnbach, Troy Elder, Adam Thurschwell, Mary Clark, Tony Varona,
Janie Chuang, Fernanda Nicola, and Ezra Rosser for guidance and comments.
1. For example, I might want to explore possibilities for reforming UCC
section 9-203 to prevent the attachment of a security interest in the context of
project finance to assets acquired while a debtor violated human rights, labor or
environmental standards. For discussion of how these standards might be
defined and of the most obvious drawbacks and benefits of this type of reform,
see infra Part II. This reform could potentially harness the control secured
lenders have over debtors to encourage corporate responsibility. In more
concrete terms, UCC section 9-102 could be revised to include definitions of
"project finance" and "project finance debtor." Then, UCC section 9-203 could be
revised to say that project finance debtors do not have, within the meaning of
the statute, "rights in collateral" acquired while taking actions in violation of
certain standards. I would like to emphasize here that I am just thinking in
public in this Essay. This reform is totally infeasible for a range of reasons
referenced in this Essay. The primary purpose of this work is to think through
whether and how a legal scholar should commit to such a project given its real-
world infeasibility.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
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. . . worship security with apostolic zeal. The secured
creditors' [sic] argue for stronger and broader security, not
for weaker and narrower security. And no one has less
power in such a debate than a law professor with a
counterintuitive idea."3
I am now not just a commercial law scholar; I am a law
professor with a counterintuitive idea. I have to reassess
the value of my project. I am not sure on what grounds a
law professor ought to present and defend a normative
position on secured transactions law that bears no
reasonable relationship to politically viable possibilities for
UCC reform.
I have written before that aesthetic elements of
commercial law deter engagement with difficult,
unanswered questions about the desirability of certain
types of reform. 4 I have written also about the infeasibility
of progressive reform of UCC Article 9 given unsecured
creditors' and third parties' tendencies to identify as
members of an imagined community of capitalist investors,
rather than as separate from and affected adversely by the
interests of financial institutions. 5 These are descriptive
critiques that deepen understanding of the workings of
commercial law. Regardless of how accurate these critiques
may be, however, the impulse can persist to try to find legal
solutions to problems that commercial law presents.
I have a reform idea for, say, UCC section 9-203, and it
is far-fetched in terms of socio-cultural acceptability and
political viability. So what? As a legal scholar, am I limited
to exploring only the possibilities for law that might
actually be enacted or applied by lawmakers? Many
developments in law seemed infeasible at first.
At this point I remember Ugo Mattei's observation that
"there is little question that U.S. law has been capable of
exaggerating the fundamental aspects of western law,
making them highly spectacular ... [for example,] scholars
are engaged in highly creative intellectual exercises with
3. James White, Work and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089,
2090-91 (1994).
4. Heather Hughes, Aesthetics of Commercial Law-Domestic and
International Implications, 67 LA. L. REV. 689, 716-17 (2007).
5. Heather Hughes, Creditors' Imagined Communities and the Unfettered
Expansion of Secured Lending, 83 DEN. U. L. REV. 425 (2005).
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little restraint from the actual technicalities of the law."'6
Building on Guy Debord's work on the idea of the spectacle
society, Mattei regards certain kinds of highly creative
intellectual exercises among American legal academics as a
symptom of U.S. dominance as a spectacular society. 7
My section 9-203 reform proposal would be an
intellectual exercise undertaken in spite of extreme
improbability of actual, technical effectuation. But, first of
all, I am a U.S. legal scholar and I think it might be naive
to attempt some renunciation of dominance. Second, it is
important that legal scholars have the capacity to go out on
a limb to articulate reforms oriented towards social justice.
The bottom line is that it is a challenge to figure out
what, how, and why to write at this late stage in the
spectacular evolution of the U.S. legal academy. Policing
lines between the legitimate and the illegitimate in the
production of professional standards is not necessarily a
conservative exercise to preserve unjust hierarchies. It is
also the essential work of staking out a space in which
hierarchies embedded in law and social order can be
challenged and undermined through the production of
hierarchies of other kinds.
On the one hand, legal academia in the U.S. rewards
theory and creativity.8 Faculties tend to frown upon "black
letter" approaches to legal scholarship. Theory is valued
highly. Yet, at the same time, most law professors are
compelled to have a purpose beyond theorizing law. Theory
is vital, but theory can't just sit around being smart. Theory
is supposed to yield understandings of law and formulations
of law that will on some level advance racial equality or
efficiency or morality or distributive justice or wealth
maximization, and so on.
Contrast this notion to Stanley Fish's "theory minimalism."
Fish argues that nothing-no practical application
whatsoever-follows from theoretical approaches to law.9
6. Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and
the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 437 (2003).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., James Gordley, Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law
Professors in the United States, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 369 (1993) (discussing
the emphasis on creativity in U.S. legal academia).
9. See Stanley Fish, Theory Minimalism, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761 (2000).
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Also, theory itself cannot provide approaches to or views of
law that transcend partisan concerns. 10 According to Fish,
as academics we study the law for its own sake and for the
sake of teaching." Advising lawmakers or taking partisan
positions is just not part of the job description. 12 Calling on
theory for transcendent understanding or legitimacy is also
not part of the job description, because no such theory will
be forthcoming. 13
Fish is an outlier with his theory minimalist position
both because legal academics want theory to do or mean
something for law itself and also because legal academics
perpetually seek explanatory or legitimating theories of law
that transcend partisan concerns. Most feel that, in one way
or another, the general purpose of legal scholarship is to
deepen understanding of law to yield answers to vexing
legal problems or justifications for lawmaking. Given that
law school is a professional school of heterodox methodologies,
it seems that for many the legitimacy of legal scholarship
lies in its relevance, however tenuous, to lawmaking. 14 This
Essay is, in part, an inquiry into why this is so.
Theories of law that explain, justify or propose
approaches to lawmaking in the "field of pain and death"'15
seem to bear a relationship to legal academia's institutional
legitimacy. Descriptive, theoretical work has value in
deepening collective understandings of law and, hence,
10. See id. at 762.
11. Stanley Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 23, 2003, http://chronicle.com/jobs/news/2003/01/2003012301c/careers.html.
12. See id.
13. See Fish, supra note 9.
14. As this Essay discusses, relevance to lawmaking can be quite tenuous. I
do not limit the range of legal academic projects that are relevant to lawmaking
to those that are explicitly normative or prescriptive. For some legal thinkers,
though, the legal academy's legitimacy is linked to its capacity to be relevant in
a very concrete way to the work that lawmakers consciously and explicitly do.
This is evidenced by the recent debate sparked by Adam Liptak's column in the
New York Times about the decline in judges' citations to law review articles.
Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews
Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8. This column was followed by
several blog discussions on the matter. See, e.g., Althouse, http://althouse.blogspot.com/
2007_03_01_archive.html (Mar. 19, 2007, 07:56 EST).
15. ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE VIOLENCE AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203, 203 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan &
Austin Sarat eds., 1995).
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law's possibilities. Arguments that present prescriptions for
lawmakers handling specific issues are contributions to
governance.
In other words, in contrast to Fish's approach, most
approaches to legal scholarship assume some causal
relationship between the research and writing of law
professors and law itself. Among and within these
approaches, of course, there is contentious debate over
(1) which theories of lawmaking are actually legitimating;
(2) which descriptive theories are true; (3) which prescrip-
tions are right; and (4) whose justice is paramount. Add to
this a range of views of what legal scholarship should look
like in terms of voice, vocabulary, structure, substantiation,
and length. And, to boot, throw in a consciousness that
different forms of legal scholarship have differing political
connotations.
In the face of this cacophony, Pierre Schlag has stepped
back and made legal scholarship itself his subject. 16 I read
his latest challenge to the legal academy just as I was
struggling to figure out whether and how to make a
counterintuitive reform proposal for secured transactions
law.
Schlag presents what he calls the "dedifferentiation
problem"-a mode of loss of external referencel 7-and
contends that this problem is "catastrophic for the ways in
which legal thinkers have usually thought about
established theories and research agendas in law."' 8 His
argument is that the collapsibility of distinctions
fundamental to most understandings of law-like the
16. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998); PIERRE SCHLAG,
LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND
(1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW].
17. Scholars in various fields have discussed and developed the concept that
ontological categories like law are constructed in the absence of reference to any
external determinant. At this point in time a range of different arguments have
proliferated around this theme. For example, Continental philosophers such as
Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida have asserted the complete non-
referentiality of concepts foundational to law. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Simulacra
and Simulations, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS 166 (Mark Poster
ed., 1988); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri C. Spivak trans.,
1976) (1967) ("There is nothing outside of the text.").
18. Pierre Schlag, The Dedifferentiation Problem 5 (Legal Stud. Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-09, 2007), available at http://ssrncom/
abstract=975810.
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distinction between law and society or law and art-makes
doing legal scholarship as we know it impossible. 19
Schlag's critique provides a useful framework for
exploring the impulse to pursue creative approaches to law
that are extremely unlikely to be implemented. This Essay
responds to Schlag and then considers whether, for my
unrealistic law reform proposal, there is any value, or any
alternative, to either utopian normativity 20 or the "as if'
thought experiment. 21
Ultimately, this is an essay about legal academic
professional responsibility from the vantage point of a
commercial law scholar. It explores implications of the
concept of loss of external reference 22 for legal scholarship.
I speculate that there is a relationship between crises of
institutional legitimacy in law and the need for most legal
scholarship to be relevant on some level to lawmaking.
When I say "relevant to lawmaking" I do not mean,
necessarily, offering legal solutions to problems or
containing explicit, normative, or prescriptive responses to
issues that law presents. Rather, I mean all legal
scholarship, however abstract, oriented in opposition to
Fish's assertion that nothing-no application whatsoever-
follows from theoretical approaches to law.
If we were to take dedifferentiation and other, more
totalizing theories of loss of reference seriously, the need for
a relationship between legal scholarship and lawmaking 23
might be understood as part of a project of constructing
viable distinctions between law/politics or law/culture in the
production of a social order. The space within this project
for unrealistic research agendas, then, becomes interesting
to define.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 24-30.
20. By this I mean an agreement in the form: we should reform the law to
read like x for reasons a and b, where a and b are not on lawmakers' radar
screen. See infra Part III.
21. By this I mean an argument in the form: if we were serious about social
objective y, we would reform the law to read like x for reasons a and b. See infra
Part III.
22. See supra note 17.
23. This assumption is, of course, contested. See generally Fish, supra note
9; Schlag, supra note 18.
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I. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND Loss OF EXTERNAL REFERENCE
Schlag offers a simple statement of loss of reference in
the context of legal scholarship. The dedifferentiation
problem is that there is nothing to be said about the
relations between two identities such as law and culture or
law and politics, law and economics, or law and language
because they are not separable in the first place.24
Schlag presents this dedifferentiation problem in the
context of cultural studies of law.25 He describes how legal
scholarship about law and culture begins with a sense of
reciprocal determination-law shapes culture, culture
shapes law.26 In order to avoid the prospect of shallow,
abstract circularity, this scholarship focuses on internal
complexities within reciprocal determination, making it
more dynamic and nuanced. 27  The dedifferentiation
problem is an experience that follows from the development
of the dynamic model. Schlag quotes Naomi Mezey's
statement: "'Perhaps we should not speak of the
"relationship" between law and culture at all, as this tends
to reinforce the distinction between the concepts that my
description here seeks to deny. '' 28
As cultural studies of law become more sophisticated,
the premise of the disciplinary framework of "law and ... "
scholarship becomes unsustainable. We cannot differentiate
law and culture to begin with; we have nothing positive to
say about their relations because we do not have two things
to relate to one another. As Schlag puts it: "What
24. See Schlag, supra note 18, at 3.
25. Id. at 6-13.
26. Id.
27. Schlag is criticizing two general categories of legal scholarship. First, he
laments the "conventional perspective" of legal scholarship that focuses just on
how law should shape society. This work overlooks reciprocal determination
and then further narrows itself by focusing on how the law should shape society
by changing rules and doctrines to achieve the desired effect. Second, he is
criticizing work in which reciprocal determination and its attendant problems
are explicit challenges, but the author still insists on the "two-way" view of
reciprocal determination. The author unreflectively relies on the "law and ..."
disciplinary framework that presumes separable subjects that can mutually
constitute one another. See id. at 9-10.
28. Id. at 11 (quoting Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
35, 46 (2001)).
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authorizes us to distinguish the legal and the social in the
first place? Why accept such a distinction? What are its
referents? In fact, are there any referents-apart from the
disciplinary frameworks that automatically reproduce such
distinctions in order to get their research agenda off the
ground?"29
The concept that it is impossible to sustain distinctions
between law and culture or politics or art, and so on, is not
new. As I read Schlag's argument, I find that one key to it is
that it is essentially about loss of reference-law and
culture as "ab initio non-referential. ' 30 If there were an
external referent or object-"law" or "culture"-then the
dedifferentiation problem would not arise because the bases
for distinction would be in reference to such object.
Numerous legal scholars have drawn on twentieth
century developments in continental philosophy to show
that concepts foundational to law lack external referent or
that distinctions between such concepts cannot be
sustained. 31 The concept of law has meaning not because it
references some object-the law-that exists, but because it
is perpetually contrasted to or distinguished from politics,
culture, art, science. Distinctions between law and culture
are constructed through perpetual comparing and
contrasting of these ideas. Meaning is produced through
contrast to other concepts that are themselves constructed
through contrast. There are no identifiable, external objects
to which these concepts refer.
Schlag does not relate his argument explicitly to any
canon of thought on non-referentiality. When I read it,
though, especially in the context of thinking about
possibilities for progressive legal scholarship, I can't help
but remember some of the more extreme and totalizing
statements of loss of reference that I have read.
For example, Jean Baudrillard's concept of simulacrum
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id.
31. See Adam Thurschwell, Critical Legal Studies, in A DICTIONARY OF
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 112-14 (John Protevi ed., 2006); see also DRUCILLA
CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT (1992) (drawing upon Derrida to
discuss judicial responsibility given that no text or tradition exists beyond the
act of interpreting it); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
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asserts that subjects are not constituted by, and do not
originate in, any objective reality beyond an endless
representation and simulation that constitutes them.32 A
simulacrum is complete continuity between real and
imaginary, model and subject, map and territory-"the
generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a
hyperreal." 33 From the vantage point of simulacra, the
ability to articulate moral order-to distinguish the
legitimate from the illegitimate-precedes the power to
differentiate between obedience and transgression, the
difference on which the law is based.34 Therefore, the state's
power to administer law is staked upon its ability to
construct with representations and contrast resonant
distinctions in the face of simulacra-the continuity of the
legitimate and the illegitimate. 35
I am reminded also of theories of indeterminacy in law;
they are rooted intellectually in this constellation of
theories about loss of reference. 36 According to these
theories, concepts (e.g., individualism) only have meaning
in reference to their opposites (e.g., altruism), and these
concepts exist in intractable contradiction. Because there is
no meta-theory with which we can resolve intractable
contradictions, legal rules are indeterminate-an
adjudicator can seek justification from either side of a
relevant binary opposition in the disposition of any given
issue. 37 Therefore, adjudication inevitably involves the
ideology or politics of the adjudicator and law cannot be
32. Some years ago I borrowed Baudrillard's concept to critique the
legislative debate over the Defense of Marriage Act. Heather Lauren Hughes,
Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra: Exploring Conceptions of Equality, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 237 (1998) (arguing that both the Defense of Marriage
Act supporters and its opponents generate distinctions in the production of a
moral order, portraying what they oppose as scandalous).
33. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 17, at 166.
34. See id. at 178.
35. See generally Hughes, supra note 32.
36. Schlag characterizes indeterminacy as a theory of law offered to
complicate reciprocal determination. Schlag, supra note 18, at 10-11. The point
here is that indeterminacy is also a theory of law derived from the concept of
non-referentiality that is central to the dedifferentiation problem. See
Thurschwell, supra note 31, at 113.
37. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976).
2007]
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extricated from politics.
Note that the assertion that law cannot be separated
out from politics is not the same as saying that law is all
just politics or it's all just ideology. The collapsibility of law
and politics just means that we must perpetually construct
the line between them in the production of legitimacy and
institutional capacity. 38
These prior applications in legal scholarship of the
concept of loss of reference or conflation of distinctions focus
on lawmaking. They state in various ways how the non-
referentiality of concepts fundamental to law creates crises
of institutional legitimacy in law. The state's capacity to
administer law depends upon its capacity to produce viable
oppositions without external reference. The indeterminacy
of legal rules threatens to reduce adjudication to the naked
exercise of political will.39
In The Dedifferentiation Problem, Schlag is arguing
about the implications of loss of reference for legal
scholarship. His concept of dedifferentiation asserts loss of
reference, but it is more modest and situated than
Baudrillard's loss of reference or Derrida's strong statement
that there is nothing outside the text.40
38. From this perspective, we might even understand a legal formalist like
Ernest Weinrib to be engaged in the same essential project as his alleged
adversaries, the critical legal theorists of the 1970s and 1980s. See Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949 (1988) (presenting "a noninstrumental conception of the rationality of
juridical relationships" and rejecting "the assumption that law is essentially
political"). It is beyond the capacity of this Essay to present and defend this
position, but the idea is that the premise that drives Weinrib's pursuit of a non-
instrumental conception of juridical relations is precisely that we must discern
immanent rationality in law or we will be left with nihilism. In other words, the
accuracy of statements of indeterminacy in law necessitates the project of
constructing a non-instrumental understanding of adjudication. Understanding
indeterminacy of legal rules does not necessarily truncate the legitimacy of a
formalist project like Weinrib's. In fact, it can underscore such project's
importance.
39. These theories continue to influence legal scholarship despite the alleged
demise of critical legal studies for want of an alternative to nihilism. In fact, we
might even go so far as to say that the accuracy of the basic critical legal studies
indeterminacy thesis drives the contemporary relevance of formalism and
natural law. Put another way, this thesis can be understood as necessitating,
for example, appeal to God as a source of legal norms. The more deeply we
understand indeterminacy, the more important transcendent sources become.
40. See E-mail from Pierre Schlag to author (Aug. 10, 2007) (on file with
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On the one hand, he argues that, for legal scholars,
recognizing that "one's key identities (law and the social)
are ab initio non-referential . .. requires abandonment of
the security of the disciplinary framework and an overhaul
of the research agenda."4 1 But at the same time he concedes
that, "in law ... differentiations are not simply intellectual
constructs but also in some sense the organization of state
and civil society."42 Differentiations central to law are
"forcefully sustained by judges, legislators, and
administrative officials,"43 and even if they "do not always
register fully or faithfully . . . they do register and
endure."44 Schlag does not take the more extreme step of
stating that distinctions crucial to lawmaking itself are
collapsible such that the legitimacy of law itself becomes
questionable, leaving us with the deep and difficult
question of how to conceive of the state's capacity to
administer violence. 45
He stays focused on his target-legal scholarship-and
says that a problem arises "to the extent that legal thinkers
adopt this language of the law as their own."46 The
"intuitive sense that the acute differentiations of law [do]
register"47 for purposes of the administration of law does
not permit legal scholars to produce and enforce a
disciplinary framework based on these differentiations. The
logic of Schlag's argument about abandonment of legal
scholarship in the face of dedifferentiation turns on the old
questions of whether and how legal scholarship is relevant
to lawmaking. 48
We are now back where we started, but with a deeper
appreciation of my initial questions. I agree that the
dedifferentiation problem as Schlag presents it exists. But
author).
41. Schlag, supra note 18, at 13.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Schlag may reach this question in other work. The critique here is
limited to Dedifferentiation.
46. Schlag, supra note 18, at 25.
47. Id.
48. Schlag himself has challenged elsewhere the relevance of legal
scholarship to lawmaking. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 16.
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deciding how to respond to this problem just raises once
again the questions that began this Essay. Most approaches
to legal scholarship assume some relationship, however
tenuous, between scholarship and the evolution of law.
Many of even the most theoretical, descriptive critiques
imply some directive, some sense that the enhanced
understanding of law gained through the critique will assist
in thinking about how to use law (or not) in the face of some
problem.49
It seems that we already produce differentiations in the
course of thought (much like we all breathe in the course of
living). When I think about this I become concerned
primarily with determining what modes of differentiation
are right or good. I do not mean to assert, here, that I have
the agency and epistemological clarity to control all of the
conceptual distinctions that I invoke. Rather, I am speaking
about how to make a conscious decision about what to write
as a legal scholar. In the context of a decision to pursue a
research agenda that will depend ex ante on certain
distinctions, the collapsibility of these distinctions as a
theoretical matter does not stop me in my tracks.
Why? Because fortifying differentiations that enable
justificatory theories for law as law operates in the field of
pain and death has moral value for all who believe that
there is at least some relationship between legal
scholarship and law. 50 After all, legal scholarship can aid in
the production of social orders. Legal scholarship can
produce justificatory theories of law in which we believe.
In this exercise I am taking dedifferentiation seriously,
but rejecting the premise that legal scholars are not
entitled to adopt the language of the law as their own. The
legal academy generally rejects this premise just as it
rejects Fish's theory minimalism. When I do so, I come to a
conclusion that is the opposite of Schlag's: the implications
of dedifferentiation are, if taken to heart, a windfall for the
ways in which legal thinkers pursue established theories
and research agendas in law.
The experience of loss of reference presents a paradox
that I experience as presenting an ethical question relevant
49. See discussion infra Part III on "prosthetic normativity."
50. Again, Schlag challenges this assumption. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE
LAW, supra note 16.
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to the work of legal scholars. 51 The paradox is that
distinctions are collapsible, yet we always generate and rely
on distinctions-between what is law and what is not, for
example-in order to think, argue, administer a civil
society, etc. The loss of reference itself is not paradoxical.
What is paradoxical is how we can understand the
collapsibility of distinctions and yet simultaneously rely on
and invoke them.
The ethical question that occurs to me once I consider
the collapse of distinctions essential to theories of law is: If
we inevitably participate in constructing differentiations in
the course of thought, what modes of differentiation are
best? It seems that, once we experience loss of reference, we
must construct realness and the capacity for reference
everywhere in the production of a social order lest this only
ever be done for us. One could object that although injecting
realness into differentiations is possible, it is a political
act.52 But from the vantage point of dedifferentiation, there
is no way to distinguish a political act from an act of law.53
If we were to accept the more totalizing theories of loss
of reference, we might find that there is a dark, compelling
reason for maintaining that legal scholarship relates and
applies to law. My purpose here is not to establish or defend
the truth of totalizing theories of loss of reference. I am not
sure that I agree with them myself and in any event they
are far more complex than they typically appear in legal
scholarship (my own included, of course).
But I do think that if we were to take the intellectual
foundations of the dedifferentiation problem seriously, a
question arises as to whether and how crises of institutional
legitimacy in law affect the professional roles of legal
academics. Schlag denounces the disciplinary framework as
a worthy referent with which to construct differentiations
51. Derrida articulated this notion that ethical questions follow immanently
from loss of reference. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation
of Authority," in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Drucilla
Cornell et al. eds., 1992); see also Adam Thurschwell, Specters and Scholars:
Derrida and the Tragedy of Political Thought, in DERRIDA BEFORE THE LAW:
DECONSTRUCTION AND LEGAL THEORY (Peter Goodrich et al. eds., forthcoming
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=654581.
52. See E-Mail from Pierre Schlag, supra note 40.
53. And, of course, I have no new suggestions on how to do this.
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foundational to theories of law.5 4 How does he distinguish
the legal academic disciplinary framework 55 from the
institutional frameworks that enable distinctions essential
to the administration of civil society? To what other, more
worthy referent do the differentiations that "register and
endure' 56 in the administration of law refer? The dedifferentiation
problem amplifies the necessity of exercises in differentiation
lest the whole enterprise disintegrate and lawmaking itself
be left without comprehensible justificatory frameworks.
One might object that law does not need a justificatory
framework-that in fact we are better off simply revealing
the brute politics and fights over resources that law can
mask. It is beyond the scope of this work to defend the need
for justificatory theories of law. Rather, I am observing this
need and relating it to theories of loss of reference and the
desire for legal scholarship to relate on some level to
lawmaking.
Now consider the impulse to present progressive
conceptions of law despite their infeasibility. We can relate
this impulse to a need to produce differentiations that
support theories of lawmaking. If we already produce
distinctions between the legitimate and the illegitimate in
the production of a legal or social order, the explication of a
desirable order is important work. My desirable social order
may very well be far from the status quo-it may involve
radical rules for secured transactions.
But if we consider concepts foundational to law to be
non-referential, there is a tension surrounding the impulse
to advance utopian law reform proposals. On the one hand,
making unrealistic reform proposals can be a way of
articulating a desirable social order-of contrasting the
legitimate and the illegitimate. On the other hand, the need
for legal scholars to maintain some claim of relevance to
lawmaking demands recognition of the relationship
between the arguments for law reform that we develop and
what is possible in the world. I am speculating that this
need is actually driven by the crises of legitimacy in law
54. See Schlag, supra note 18, at 13.
55. I understand the "disciplinary framework" to mean a template for
academic thinking about law in which certain distinctions-between law and
art, for example-are unreflectively assumed.
56. Schlag, supra note 18, at 24.
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itself that so many other thinkers have identified.57
If we view the need for most legal scholarship to be
relevant on some level to lawmaking as related to loss of
reference within law itself then the utopian research
agenda poses a challenge. It becomes important to figure
out how it might be possible for a law review article to at
the same time (i) propose unrealistic reform in the
articulation of a desirable social order and (ii) maintain
some theoretical relevance to lawmaking, however tenuous.
Parts II and III below explore strategies for doing this.
II. A COUNTERINTUITIVE IDEA FOR SECURED TRANSACTIONS
LAW
At this point I want to present an example of an
infeasible law reform proposal. Again, the primary purpose
of this work is not to thoroughly explicate and troubleshoot
this proposal, but to think through whether, as a legal
scholar, I ought to undertake such a project in the first
place. Part III then situates this proposal vis-A-vis loss of
external reference and its implications for legal scholarship.
In the past year I have heard a couple of presentations
by law professors about non-state actors, corporate
responsibility, and the role of transnational corporations.
Discussions about transnational corporations and human
rights or the environment tend to focus on activities at the
level of the corporation and the state's capacity to regulate
them.
As someone who writes and teaches about secured
lending, I see transnational corporations as debtors or,
more likely, parents of debtors. Transnational corporations
can make promises to act responsibly, but they are rarely
spending their own cash on the projects that yield the
results in question. They are borrowing funds from lenders
and those lenders typically retain significant control over
their debtors' activities through financing covenants to
ensure that they get repaid.
The concept of corporate responsibility might have more
teeth if it were taken up a level on the financial food
chain-i.e., if it extended to parties that finance the
57. See, e.g., BAUDRILLARD, supra note 17; KENNEDY, supra note 37; Weinrib,
supra note 38.
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activities of corporations. I sometimes wonder if the costs of
capital that large corporations seem to require to
participate in development projects, combined with the
levels of investors that ultimately fund these projects, 58
fatally complicate efforts to corral corporations themselves
into respecting the positions of affected communities and
lands.
The law could take corporate responsibility up the
financial food chain by redefining the concept of debtor
"rights in the collateral" for purposes of UCC section 9-203
in the context of project finance. This could be a global
justice activist's dream UCC revision. It would harness the
control that secured creditors have over corporate debtors
in order to curb violations of certain labor, environmental or
human rights standards.
I am going to explain-schematically-what I have in
mind and what I think the major pitfalls and benefits of
this reform would be. Keep in mind, though, that this
reform is infeasible. My own prior work discusses how both
aesthetics of commercial law and creditors' imagined
communities deter consideration of this type of reform.59 My
own work aside, scholars widely recognize the UCC drafting
process as one in which proposed revisions that potentially
limit businesses' access to credit are dead on arrival. 60
58. In a typical development project, the transnational corporation forms a
subsidiary or project company that will take title to all of the assets of the
project and borrow funds from the project lenders to acquire and develop the
assets. The lenders are looking to the proceeds of the project over time for
repayment. The lenders may sell participations in the project loan or the project
loan may become part of a portfolio that the lenders themselves borrow against
or securitize. In other words, the number of investors can multiply and become
more remote from the original project lenders, making the possibility of
renegotiation or adjustment in the face of unforeseen problems on the ground
more difficult.
59. Hughes supra note 4; Hughes, supra note 5.
60. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will
Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 632
(1998) (citing Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 327); Elizabeth Warren,
Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1374 n.3 (1997); see also Steven L. Harris & Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the
Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1349, 1356-64 (1997); Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope of Revised Article 9 is
Justified, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 328, 328-29 (1996); William J.
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Further, my proposal would require the UCC drafters to
dedicate substantial resources to figuring out how to define
the circumstances in which security interests would no
longer attach under section 9-203; even substantial efforts
might yield standards and definitions that create
uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of certain
security interests. Revisions that consciously create uncertainty
are as anathema to the ambitions of UCC Article 9 as are
revisions that reduce access to credit.
That said, in the area of project financing, secured
lenders have already articulated the "Equator Principles. '61
These are industry standards for loans that the Equator
Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) consider to be
responsible to make. 62 Numerous major U.S. and foreign
lenders such as Bank of America, ABN AMRO, and Wells
Fargo are EPFIs.
In a nutshell, the EPFIs agree (i) to assess the social
and environmental impact of projects using standards
developed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
and the World Bank; (ii) to require debtors to have an
action plan for continuing compliance with these standards,
including a grievance mechanism and mechanisms for
consulting with all sectors of affected communities; and (iii)
to incorporate into their loan documents covenants linked to
compliance.6 3 I have not as of yet uncovered any reports of
instances in which a debtor has breached these covenants,
let alone any instance in which, in response to a breach, an
EPFI has pursued remedies. In other words, the practical
effect of the Equator Principles at this point is unclear. I
use them here to illustrate that lenders have contemplated
their role vis-A-vis corporate responsibility in the project
finance context.64
Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law
Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511 (1997).
61. THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES": A FINANCIAL INDUSTRY BENCHMARK FOR
DETERMINING, ASSESSING AND MANAGING SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN
PROJECT FINANCING (July 2006), http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/
EquatorPrinciples.pdf.
62. Id. at 1.
63. Id. at 2-5.
64. This industry acknowledgment is very exciting. It opens up possibilities
for calling upon parties to a range of different types of structured financings to
covenant to produce certain results. See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Understanding
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One way to think of my idea for UCC section 9-203 is as
an augmentation and codification of rules that the project
financing industry has already voluntarily adopted. Given
current levels of environmental damage, for example, why
continue to let powerful industries self-regulate? Of course,
this reform would only apply to transactions governed by
UCC Article 9, but that is a huge number of transactions. 65
But again, the fact that many major project lenders
have adopted the Equator Principles does not mean that my
UCC section 9-203 has real-world traction. There is a huge
difference between industry acknowledgment of the need to
facilitate responsible projects and industry capacity to
accept a commercial code that complicates as a matter of
law the enforceability of security interests themselves.
UCC section 9-203 specifies the requirements for
creating an enforceable security interest. The basic
requirements are that (i) the debtor agrees to grant a
security interest; (ii) the creditor extends value; and (iii) the
debtor has rights in the collateral. 66 The requirement that
the debtor have rights in the collateral simply ensures that
the debtor has the capacity to grant an interest in the
collateral. One cannot transfer more than one has.
In theory, this simple property concept could be altered
for purposes of this statute to deny a debtor's rights to
transfer an interest in personal property that it acquires
unethically in the context of project financing. UCC section
9-102 could be revised to include definitions of "project
finance"67 and "project finance debtor. ' 68 Then, UCC section
the Development Potential of Worker Remittance Securitization (Aug. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
65. I focus on Article 9's attachment provision and not its priority rules
precisely because enforceability of security interests governed by Article 9 is
determined by compliance with section 9-203. Priority, on the other hand, can
be the province of the law where collateral is located. Also, the purpose of this
proposed reform is not primarily to alter the distributive effects of Article 9 in
bankruptcy. It is to harness creditors' monitoring power to avert certain types of
debtor behavior during the life of the project.
66. U.C.C. § 9-203 (2000).
67. I will borrow the EPFIs' definition here:
Project finance (PF) is a method of funding in which the lender looks
primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the
source of repayment and as security for the exposure. This type of
financing is usually for large, complex and expensive installations that
might include, for example, power plants, chemical processing plants,
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9-203 could be revised to say that project finance debtors do
not have, within the meaning of the statute, "rights in
collateral" acquired while taking actions that result in
violation of certain human rights, labor, or environmental
standards.
Defining these standards for purposes of the UCC
would be a challenge. Definitions of standards in each of the
areas of human rights, labor, and environment would need
to be developed and referenced in the statute.
A project financer's security interest would not attach
to-meaning it would not extend to or be enforceable
against-assets that the debtor acquired during a period of
time in which it was also violating the prescribed
standards. If security interests did not attach in such
circumstances, then project financers would have a strong
incentive to use financing covenants and monitoring to
ensure that debtors take care to protect interests of affected
communities. 69 Again, the Equator Principles already
require major lenders to include such covenants in their
loan documents. The idea here is that the proposed
revisions to the attachment provisions of the UCC would
force project lenders to monitor compliance with these
covenants and increase the likelihood that they exercise
remedies upon breach.
mines, transportation infrastructure, environment, and telecommunications
infrastructure. Project finance may take the form of financing of the
construction of a new capital installation, or refinancing of an existing
installation, with or without improvements. In such transactions, the
lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively out of the money
generated by the contracts for the facility's output, such as the
electricity sold by a power plant. The borrower is usually an SPE
[Special Purpose Entity] that is not permitted to perform any function
other than developing, owning, and operating the installation. The
consequence is that repayment depends primarily on the project's cash
flow and on the collateral value of the project's assets.
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS 49 (2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsll8.pdf.
68. A "project finance debtor" would be a debtor that is a party to a project
financing.
69. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997), for a discussion of the effects of the monitoring power
of secured creditors. See also Douglas G. Baird, Secured Lending and its
Uncertain Future, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1792-96 (2004); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 903-04 (1986).
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This idea has, of course, potential drawbacks even if it
were possible to enact. One might say it allocates the costs
of a company's non-compliance to parties without the best
information or control over the company's activities. But the
idea here is not to shift costs from the company to its
lenders. It is to magnify the costs of non-compliance for both
debtors and lenders in order to more forcefully require
adherence to norms designed to avoid the externalization of
costs to third parties. Failing to abide by the prescribed
standards would become too costly for a corporation to
contemplate since this would jeopardize the corporation's
ability to obtain financing.
This type of reform might make secured lending itself
too costly to undertake. Companies might turn to borrowing
exclusively on an unsecured basis. They might look
primarily to devices like negative pledge clauses, in
combination with transfer of assets to special purpose
vehicles with no other creditors, in order to avoid the
increased costs of secured borrowing under this more
complex and costly schema.
In any event, challenges this section 9-203 idea would
face include defining in a clear way the circumstances in
which interests would not attach and overcoming technical
complications. The project here is not to take on these
challenges, but to try to think through why and how to
devote resources to such an idea at all given its real-world
infeasibility.
III. SITUATING THIS REFORM PROPOSAL VIS-A-VIS Loss OF
REFERENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The counterintuitive idea for secured transactions law
described in Part II is just one example of a progressive
experiment that a professor might think about proposing in
the form of a law review article. Given that the reform will
not be enacted, what form might such an article take and
what might its value be?
To summarize where we've been, theorists have used
the concept of loss of reference to show crises of
institutional legitimacy in law. Loss of reference in
lawmaking itself drives a need for sustainable distinctions
and non-instrumental conceptions of juridical relations.
Legal scholars participate in the construction of sustainable
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differentiations that lawmaking requires. The dedifferentiation
problem as Schlag presents it surely exists. But if taken to
its logical conclusion and read in light of its own intellectual
roots, it actually produces a possible justification for the
legal academic disciplinary framework.
On the one hand, the section 9-203 reform proposal
described in Part II is infeasible. On the other hand, the
proposal itself articulates one view of desirable social and
legal order. If we think of concepts foundational to law as
non-referential, it seems imperative to engage in the
production of desirable legal and social orders. From the
vantage point of loss of external reference we must engage
in the production of distinctions between the desirable and
the undesirable in order to fortify the distinctions on which
the law is based.
To do this, we could simply argue for reform in a state
of utopian normativity. By utopian normativity, I mean
arguments that take the form: we should revise UCC
section 9-203 to read like x for reasons a, b, and c. This type
of argument seems to say that when the forces of the
universe shift and the political tide starts flowing my way,
my reform proposal will be all ready. If lightning strikes the
UCC drafters and they turn into global justice activists, I've
got the statutory experiment for them.
The assertion that the universe should change to
accommodate a progressive experiment is a type of
statement of desirable social order. Inviting readers to
think through a possibility for using the UCC to effectuate
corporate responsibility presents and produces distinctions
between legitimate and illegitimate approaches to project
finance.
But at the same time acknowledging the project of
producing differentiations in the construction of a social
order is not license to write just anything. Rather, this
project leads to heightened sensitivity to professional
objectives.
In other words, the problem with simply arguing for the
reform of UCC section 9-203 described in Part II is that it is
so infeasible that any pretense to relevance to lawmaking
seems lost. Again, the universe of projects that I consider
"relevant to lawmaking" is not limited to politically feasible
normative or prescriptive projects. I include in the "relevant
to lawmaking" category all projects oriented in opposition to
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Fish's assertion that no applications whatsoever follow from
legal academic writing. The vast majority of legal academic
projects purport to be relevant to lawmaking in some way.
Part of the collective legal academic project is in crafting
and maintaining this conceptual relevance-it is linked to
our capacity to construct and fortify the distinctions on
which law relies as it operates in the field of pain and
death. This Essay is, again, about how and why this is so
and, given that it is so, whether and why to present totally
infeasible reform proposals.
On the one hand, simply arguing for the UCC section 9-
203 reform is not good because its infeasibility undermines
the capacity to feel relevant to law. On the other hand, the
problem of negative externalities of companies' activities
and the fact that lenders are a potential source of control
over those activities persists; the reform proposal does
articulate one view of desirable order.
Another approach might be to present the infeasible
reform argument in the form of an "as if' thought
experiment. By the "as if' thought experiment, I mean
arguments that take the form: if we were serious about
equality/fairness/social objective y, then UCC section 9-203
should be revised to read like x.
In the context of the reform described in Part II, we
might say: if we were serious about curbing irresponsible
projects that hurt people and the environment, we would
refuse to enforce security interests in assets acquired
through such projects.
The "if' component acknowledges the infeasibility of the
ensuing reform proposal; it thereby brings the project a
little closer to earth. But standing alone, this "as if"
approach implies a call to get serious about social objective
y. This makes it very close to utopian normativity. Again,
the idea here is that, on the one hand, we need to articulate
some desirable legal order, but on the other hand, we need
to maintain some conceptual relevance to lawmaking for
the sake of the legitimacy of the enterprise-for the sake of
protecting the space in which legal scholars might define
desirable orders.
There is a way to do this. It is possible to build on the
"as if' thought experiment by stating that getting serious
about objective y will not happen for reasons p and q.
Discussing the prospect of reform x in the context of
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explication of p and q then becomes a form of dialectical
edification-a way of demonstrating how the law does and
does not work. This approach can be relevant to lawmaking
on some level, however tenuous, and at the same time
articulate unrealistic reform ideas.
Again, in the context of the reform described in Part II,
we might say: if we were serious about curbing
irresponsible projects that hurt people and the environment
(social objective y), we would refuse to enforce security
interests in assets acquired through such projects (reform
x). We will not get serious about social objective y, however,
because aesthetics of commercial law (factor p) deter
consideration of reform x70  and creditors' imagined
communities (factor q) make reform x politically unworkable. 71
This is a fine way to construct an academic argument
and falls into the realm of the descriptive theory that
deepens understanding of law's possibilities. Because this
approach focuses on p and q-not just reform x-it is a way
to present reform x despite its political infeasibility. This
approach does the best job, I think, of navigating the
tension between the need to articulate a desirable social
order and the need to have some conceptual relevance to
lawmaking.
The relevance of this type of argument to law is more
tenuous than in more straight-forward normative
arguments. The idea is that a theoretical explication of a
problem in law through dialectical edification functions to
deepen understanding of law. This better understanding of
law helps strategic thinking about how to use law (or not)
in response to the problem.
We might call this prosthetic normativity. Prosthetics
sometimes complete bodies that the dominant culture
perceives as lacking something, such as in the case of
amputees. Other times, prosthetics enhance or transform
bodies that are not otherwise incomplete by dominant
aesthetic standards, such as in the cases of trans-gendered
persons or of actors. In either case, we can view prosthetics
as continuous with the flesh or, conversely, as inconsistent,
as an artificial extension of the flesh. From either vantage
point they are not quite real, but they have a certain
70. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 716-17.
71. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 429-31.
20071 885
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
utility-they do a job.
The institutional need for most legal scholarship to be
on some level relevant to lawmaking yields a preference for
certain forms of completeness of argument in legal
academia. We are more sophisticated than to think that
every article has to offer prescriptions to a problem.
However, the majority in legal academia rejects Fish's
theory minimalism. Many are unprepared to adopt the view
that no application whatsoever follows from theoretical
legal scholarship.
So, even legal scholars who pursue abstract, descriptive
theories of law tend to take a kind of normative step. This
step is to say that the greater understanding that we gain
from the critique at issue could lead to improved
lawmaking, though, of course, the task of lawmaking is
obviously remote from the methodology of the critique. 72
This type of normative turn can complete otherwise
disturbing arguments. Some accept it as a logical
component of the whole and others identify it immediately
as foreign. Some don't even notice the seams. Others
remain disturbed.
72. Even anti-normativity guru Schlag has been known to engage in this
type of normative turn. See Fish, supra note 9, at 768-71 (pointing out a
normative component in Schlag's work).
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